Europe’s Critical Minerals Test: Build Industry With Its Neighbors

The European Union’s Critical Raw Materials Act sets 2030 targets: extract 10% of annual strategic-material consumption within the bloc, process 40% and meet 25% through recycling. It also aims to ensure that no more than 65% of any strategic raw material comes from a single non-EU country. Progress has been limited: in early 2026, the European Court of Auditors said diversification efforts had yet to produce tangible results. Ten of the 26 materials needed for the energy transition were not recycled, while seven had recycling rates of just 1–5%.

Processing is a particular vulnerability. China controls an estimated 81% of global critical-mineral processing capacity, meaning new mines alone would not guarantee Europe control over supply chains. Deposits in neighboring countries could be linked to European transport, industrial clusters and capital markets, but proximity cannot create an integrated chain without policy and investment.

Ukraine’s government says the country has deposits of 22 of the 34 materials the EU classifies as critical. The EU Institute for Security Studies highlights graphite, titanium and manganese, as well as lithium, cobalt, nickel, magnesium, baryte and rare earth elements. But geological occurrences are not necessarily recoverable reserves. Much of Ukraine’s geological data is old, projects need exploration and infrastructure, and the war complicates financing, insurance and construction. Ukrainian estimates cited by Reuters put around 40% of the country’s metal resources in Russian-occupied territory.

The EU has maintained a strategic raw-material partnership with Ukraine since 2021, covering entire critical-material and battery value chains. The article argues that reconstruction could build on that approach through geological mapping, transparent licensing, renewable power, processing, transport infrastructure, technical education and recycling.

Serbia illustrates the political risks. Earlier project estimates put potential annual output from the Jadar deposit at around 58,000 tonnes of battery-grade lithium carbonate, enough for roughly one million electric vehicles. The European Commission has recognized Jadar as a strategic project outside the EU, and Brussels has signed a partnership with Serbia on raw materials, batteries and electric vehicles. But the project has drawn mass protests over water, agriculture, environmental risks, consultation and trust in institutions.

The article argues that supply security depends on public legitimacy as well as technical feasibility. It calls for environmental and labor standards equivalent to those in the EU, transparent contracts, independent monitoring, local revenue sharing, workforce development and plans for downstream investment. EU finance, guarantees and advance-purchase commitments could also help make projects viable.

Ukraine and the Western Balkans cannot meet all of Europe’s needs: deposits will take years to verify, some projects may prove uneconomic, and others may carry costs too high to justify. The proposed opportunity is to pair resource development with regional processing, manufacturing and recycling—so enlargement supports industrial integration rather than simply exporting raw materials.